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As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has juris-
diction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings. 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's re-
cord, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by agency action which is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
the light of the whole record before the court and/or the agency action is an abuse 
of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute and/or otherwise arbitrary or 
capricious [emphasis added].Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-16 (1); (4)(g); and (4)(h)(i) 
& (iv), (1953). 
This appeal is from Administrative Law Judge Sims' ("Sims'") "Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order" issuing from the Utah Labor Commission 
after a formal adjudicative proceeding. 
II. ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
A. Statement of Issues 
Ms. Schwinn ("Schwinn") asserts that Sims decided to deny her appeal before 
the hearing was held, and created whatever "Findings" he needed to justify his de-
nial. By actual count, less than one third of the statements in his "Findings" are both 
accurate and relevant. 
Schwinn is appealing Sims' "Findings.. .Order" because his "Findings" do not 
reflect the facts that comprise the record of this case, being so distorted and errone-
ous that they clearly satisfy the ordinary usage and legal definitions of the word 
"fraud". Webster's New World Dictionary 555 (2d College Edition 1984). 
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In this appeal, Schwinn asks this Court to review the entire record and com-
pare it with Sims' "Findings" in order to ascertain if they are factual, relevant, and 
in the record. 
Based on Its review of the record and Its comparisons of the record to Sims' 
"Findings", Schwinn asks this Court to decide three issues: 
A. Did Appellant receive a fair and impartial hearing by the ALJ and 
agents Labor Commission of Utah? 
B. Does the record support Ms. Schwinn's right, under the law, to re-
ceive workers' compensation benefits? 
C. As a sub-issue, Appellant alleges that the ALJ and the appeals board 
committed criminal misconduct and possibly other crimes during the course 
of this case, which raises suspicions that there may be corruption throughout 
the labor commission. Therefore, Appellant asks the Court to determine 
whether or not her allegations and suspicions of criminal wrongdoing have 
merit and, if indicated, refer criminal matters to the appropriate authorities. 
Schwinn alleges that one reason Sims felt he had to make his own case for 
denying her benefits and took so much time to issue his "Findings. .. Order", may 
have been because most unemployed, injured people lose their "fight" and do not 
have the financial resources to appeal to this Court. Most likely, he believed this of 
Schwinn, as well. 
B. Standard of Review 
Constitutional questions are characterized as questions of law, and under 
UCA S 63-46b-16(4)(d), agency determinations of general law-which include in-
terpretations of the state and federal constitutions are to be reviewed under a cor-
xection-of-error standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision. Questar 
Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 817 P.2d 316 (Utah 1991). 
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In applying the "substantial evidence test," the appellate court reviews the 
"whole record" before the court, and this review is distinguishable from both a de 
novo review and the "any competent evidence" standard of review. Grace Drilling 
Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "Substantial evidence" 
is more than a mere "scintilla" of evidence, though something less than the weight 
of the evidence. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion. Id. 
The party challenging the "Findings" must marshal all of the evidence sup-
porting the "Findings" and show that despite the supporting facts, the agency's 
"Findings" are not supported by substantial evidence. First Nat'l Bank v. County 
Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990); Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 
v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Under the "whole record test," a court must consider not only the evidence 
supporting the board's factual "Findings", but also the evidence that fairly detracts 
from the weight of the board's evidence. Garfield Smelting Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 53 Utah Subsections 133, 178 P. 57 (1918). 
IV. STA TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The underlying case giving rise to this appeal is an application for workers' 
compensation benefits under an "occupational disease" claim. Section 34A-3-106 
establishes the standards for determining compensation eligibility: 
(1) Physical, mental, or emotional diseases related to mental stress aris-
ing out of and in the course of employment shall be compensable under this 
chapter only when there is a sufficient legal and medical causal connection 
between the employee's disease and employment. 
(2)(a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary mental stress 
arising predominantly and directly from employment. 
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(b) The extraordinary nature of the alleged mental stress is according to 
an objective standard in comparison with contemporary national employment 
and non employment life. 
Schwinn asserts that she meets all points of the law, e.g., she became clini-
cally depressed as a direct result of HAI's work environment, suffered symptomol-
ogy and deterioration of her physical well-being in addition to her depression, and 
therefore, is unable to work outside of her home or for the extended periods of time 
required by a full-time job. 
Extensive discovery included a psychiatric report by HAI's contracted psy-
chiatrist, David McCann ("McCann"), which was supposedly based on neuropsy-
chological and psychological evaluations, a review of Schwinn's medical records 
and an interview with Schwinn (approximately two hours). However, his report 
directly conflicted with those evaluations, as well as with Schwinn's medical re-
cords; a rebuttal by Schwinn's former therapist; and a rebuttal by a licensed clinical 
psychologist after a four-hour interview, informal assessment, and review of the 
same records and neuropsychological/psyetiological evaluations. 
During Schwinn's 2 1/2-day evidentiary hearing, seven witnesses testified. 
Five witnesses including Schwinn, discredited McCann's report, and the record 
supports Schwinn's eligibility under an "occupational disease" claim for benefits. 
However, Sims' "Findings".. .Order", which did not issue for over five months 
following the hearing, denied her claim without mentioning any witnesses or 
reflecting what is in the record. 
B. Statement of the Facts 
Schwinn asks this Court to read her entire log in order to get a clear, accurate 
picture of the sequence of events in context, how she felt about them and why, how 
they effected her mental and physical health, her determination to solve the prob-
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lems and keep her job, and how the deliberately inflicted stress created the clinical 
depression that made it impossible for her to work anyplace. (R-377 @ The). 
1. Schwinn began working for Human Affairs International (HAI) as an as-
sociate proposal writer, a newly-created position, March 7, 1994. During her inter-
view for the job, Eric Epperson ("Epperson"), department manager, indicated she 
would be paid at the bottom of the associate pay scale. (R-380). He also indicated 
there would be many opportunities for her to advance in the company, including to 
a proposal writing position. (Tr.-80 @ 6). Her job was to help proposal writers with 
their research, organize and provide references, and insert prospect-specific infor-
mation into generic (boilerplate) proposals. (Tr-80 @ 22). 
2. Within two months, management realized that writers had to do their own 
research, which left Schwinn time to start to answer simple prospect companies' 
questionnaires that were assigned to her. In another month, she was writing full 
proposals, with very little supervision. She asked to be considered for a new pro-
posal writer position which was to be filled in June. (R-380 @ Neither). 
3. Schwinn's immediate supervisor, Marsha Peters ("Peters"), had encouraged 
her to apply, saying she had had enough experience and knowledge about the prod-
ucts to do the work. Although she did not volunteer compliments, when Schwinn 
asked how she was doing, Peters always told her she was doing well. (Id; Tr-516 
@1) 
4. Neither Peters nor Epperson told Schwinn she had to fill out a formal ap-
plication in order to be considered nor did either discuss her qualifications with her. 
(Tr-86 @ 25). Epperson ignored her request other than saying, in passing, that she 
needed to prove herself before she could be promoted which she thought she had 
done. He also said.no one could be promoted until they had been with the company 
a year; however, she verified with Human Resources ("HR") that employees could 
be promoted in their own departments at anytime (R-380). Schwinn reported this to 
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Epperson who said he would "look into it." Later, he announced the position was 
filled. 
5. During Schwinn's first annual review, in March 1995, she expected to be 
promoted to writer because of Peters' praise, and she knew she had been doing the 
same work as the writers for some nine months; however, Epperson clearly did not 
know that. (R-380 @ March 30, June). For instance, he told her if she kept working 
hard and learning she could one day write a proposal like "X", and was surprised 
when she told him she did write "X". Schwinn also told Peters she had written "X" 
but another writer was given credit for it and no more was said. (Tr-88 @ 9, 126 @ 
9; R-382 @ Funny). 
6. Peters told her she should be promoted and encouraged her to go to the vice 
president in charge of the department, Stephanie Boyers ("Boyers"), to push for it 
(R 384 @ June). Schwinn was finally promoted to writer in December 1995, but 
her raise was only to the middle of the associate scale. Although her wages are not 
an issue in this matter, being so significantly underpaid sent the unmistakable mes-
sage to her that she was not valuable to the company.. .a key issue. 
7. Although many things had happened up to that point that had seriously 
damaged her self-confidence and -respect, Schwinn gradually realized she was in a 
no-win situation from then on. She could not discern who was playing what roles 
nor what the rules were, and she mistakenly thought she could solve the problems 
and survive is clear from her testimony. 
8. From February 1996 until she quit, Epperson told Schwinn she had to learn 
to do things she was already doing exceedingly well, and accused her of errors she 
did not make. However, he never gave her one clue about what mistakes she was 
allegedly making so she could correct them or show him she hadn't made them, 
although she literally pleaded for specific, helpful information. She tried to counter 
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his generalized allegations the best she could, but he acted as though those conver-
sations never took place. 
9. Following are examples of the quandaries Schwinn found herself in: 
i. As already noted, credit for her work was given to others, such as 
complex and successful proposals she had written and many of her contribu-
tions to the department's data base. (R-393 @ But-394 @ say, 429 @ in case; 
Tr 904 @ (a)4, 907 (a)4). 
ii. When a new computer system was installed, her assigned computer 
did not have enough memory (the least in the department) to handle the pro-
grams and crashed, dumping her work, at least 12 times a week, often three 
times a day. All the other computers in the department that could not handle 
the programs were replaced or upgraded, except Schwinn's, and Epperson 
never did anything about hers. He would not even let her use one of three 
working computers that were available, then reprimanded her when she asked 
for overtime to meet deadlines. (R-390 @ every-394 @ I, 386 @ January 24 -
387 @ worse) 
iii. Epperson also accused her of missing many deadlines although she 
has never missed one in her life. 
iv. Epperson accused her of sending wrong information in proposals 
although he would not tell her what. (R-407 @ July 15-Politicians. Note log 
pages out of order.). 
v. Epperson said three sales agents refused to work with her, but he 
would not tell her who they were or how she had allegedly offended them Id. 
In fact, the director of sales complimented her work on two proposals she 
wrote for him during that time, one by Email, which she forwarded to Epper-
son. He did not acknowledge it except to say he got it. (R-904). 
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10. On May 29, 1996, Epperson gave Schwinn a 30-day warning letter, which 
included the exact allegations he wrote in her review. In a letter dated June 29, with 
identical allegations, he put her on probation,. (R-407, 904). He told her she had 
improved "marginally", but when she asked how she had improved, he didn't know. 
Id. In addition, he admitted he had no complaints about her since the warning. 
11. Schwinn had always had high-pressure jobs, but had excellent stress man-
agement skills, loved her work and was always complimented on her professional 
skills. (R-37). No job had ever seriously stressed her, let alone depressed her. For 18 
months after she was hired, Epperson's false accusations, nearly all of which he 
admitted came from Peters, had seriously eaten into Schwinn's self-confidence and -
respect. (R-385). She had become seriously withdrawn. (R-384). 
12. Schwinn continued to do her work in a professional, and apparently suc-
cessful manner until Epperson put her on probation. The ongoing, frustrating stress 
had accumulated into serious depression that was causing her physical health to 
deteriorate and she quit to rescue herself before she was totally non-functional. (R-
405, 407; note pages are out of order). 
13. It was generally accepted knowledge in the department that Epperson not 
only did not know what anyone did, he did not even know what he was supposed to 
do. (R- 404 @ Eric-didn't, 408 @ Demonstrate-tell him). Furthermore, it is clear 
throughout his cross-examination at the hearing that all he knew was what Peters 
told him. (Tr-691). Schwinn suspected Epperson was no more than Peters' pawn, 
and their testimonies, in context, demonstrated that she was right. (Tr-651) 
14. Schwinn was 60 years old when she started working at HAI, which was 
her only source of income. At that age, it is difficult, if not impossible to get a job. 
Therefore, she desperately needed to stay at HAI. Also, she is, by nature, a good 
problem solver. (R-378@ I am) As is also her nature, she did everything she could 
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to improve her skills and knowledge, which she makes clear throughout her testi-
mony. (Tr-61). 
15. Nothing Schwinn did made any difference. Epperson told her that Boyers 
agreed with his decisions. (R-410). In a staff meeting, Boyers forbid department 
employees to go to HR for any reason (lasted about six months). (Tr-514 @ 8; R-
382 @ Someone). Therefore, when Schwinn's accumulating confusion and frustra-
tion began to cause serious stress, she contacted Aetna's HR, which referred her 
back to HAI's HR, where she was forbidden to go. Id. 
15. Schwinn was trapped at HAI, with no way to solve problems and virtually 
no hope of getting another job; therefore, she withdrew, did her best, and tried to 
meet Epperson's and Peters' unreasonable demands. By the time Epperson put 
Schwinn on probation, she could not continue and finally faced the fact that there 
was no hope. (R-417 @ 4:45-yet). 
17. In her resignation letter, which she copied to Boyers and HAI's CEO and 
HR director, Schwinn described in detail what she had been subjected to because 
the resignation had to be put in her personnel record and she wanted her state-
ment/story to be in that record, also. Although irrational and naive, she still hoped 
someone might make things right and would help her so she could continue to 
work. No one so much as acknowledged they received her letter, except Epperson, 
who had to formally accept her resignation. (R-405) 
18. Schwinn applied for workers' compensation benefits and was denied. She 
appealed to the labor commission, which scheduled evidentiary and held an eviden-
tiary hearing for June 29, 1997. 
19. At HAI's request and expense, Schwinn met with McCann, it's psychia-
trist, May 23, 1997. He interviewed her for about two hours, and his secretary ad-
ministered psychological tests, which a psychologist, Leslie Cooper ("Cooper") 
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evaluated. McCann also referred her to a neuropsychologist, David Gale ("Gale") 
for additional tests. Gale completed his report June 4, 1997. 
20. Without consulting her attorney, Karen Beausoleil, Ph.D. ("Beausoleil"), 
Schwinn signed a document agreeing to McCann's stipulation that no one could 
accompany her during her interview and testing because she knew the truth would 
support her claim. It never crossed her mind that McCann would not be ethical and 
his report would have nothing to do with truth. 
21. Beausoleil, a certified school psychologist (WY&CA), wanted to be with 
Schwinn to protect her rights; therefore, she accompanied Schwinn to McCann's 
office for the evaluation believing McCann would make an exception because of 
her qualifications and extensive experience in psychology. He denied her request. 
(R-139@Para. 1,2). 
22. Beausoleil did not receive a copy of McCann's report until four days be-
fore the hearing and was shocked that he had diagnosed Schwinn with a serious 
psychological disorder that Schwinn could not have had. McCann's reason for not 
allowing her to stay with Schwinn was obvious. (R-139). 
23. Four days was not enough time to secure a "real" independent evaluation. 
Nevertheless, Charles McCusker, Ph.D. ("McCusker"), a highly qualified, experi-
enced, and licensed psychologist, took time to spend approximately four hours with 
Schwinn and review the same medical records McCann had access to, including 
Cooper's and Gale's evaluations. Then he wrote a rebuttal in which he said he not 
only saw no signs of the diagnosis McCann had attributed to Schwinn, but that she 
was not at all the person McCann described. (R-227). Especially significant is the 
fact that McCann's report directly conflicted with Cooper's and Gale's reports. Mc-
Cann referred to neither evaluation. 
24. It should be noted that Schwinn filed a complaint against McCann with 
the Utah Psychiatric Association Ethics Board. (R-1072, 1073). 
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25. Schwinn's decline in functionality has been measured by a standardized 
rating system, the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF). Her EAP therapist, 
Barbara Belnap ("Belnap") rated her at "90" on February 15, 1996, on a scale of 1 -
90, when Schwinn first met with her to discuss her problems at HAI. Three days 
after she left HAI, on July 11,1996 (five months later) Belnap rated her at "50". (R-
107,114 @ Case Overview). 
26. When McCann "evaluated" Schwinn on May 23, 1997, he rated her at 
"70". If he can be believed, that is only halfway to full recovery; if not, her true 
rating was most likely lower considering that he was being paid to make the case 
that she was able to work. (R-152). 
27. Seven witnesses (including Schwinn) testified at the hearing, and a six-
inch stack of evidence was accepted into the record. Schwinn proved her case with 
overwhelming evidence and testimony. 
28. At the end of the hearing, Sims' said he would begin to work on the case 
immediately and indicated Schwinn could expect his "Findings.. .Order" in about a 
week, but he did not issue these until December 12. (Tr-792 @ 19: R-949). 
29. In his "Findings", Sims expanded on McCann's report. Otherwise, he only 
referred to a couple of selected, negative portions of out-of-context documents in 
evidence and did not refer to any of the testimonies, except a few negative, per-
sonal (his own) interpretations of what Schwinn said. He also personally and 
falsely attacked McCusker's credibility which even HAI's attorneys did not do. His 
"Findings" were no more than his own testimony taken, in part, from HAI's opening 
statement. (Tr.-46) 
30. Schwinn appealed to the Labor Commission's Appeals Board, which she 
filed timely according to Sims' instructions. The board upheld Sims' denial after it 
had "carefully reviewed the record.. .carefully considered the facts." (R-1065, 
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1066). However, the board could not have done so because it did not have a tran-
script of the hearing. (Schwinn had to have it transcribed for this appeal.) 
31. Schwinn timely filed an appeal with the Utah Supreme Court because this 
is a test case with far-reaching implications and because it includes a constitutional 
issue: The commission denied Schwinn's due process right to a fair and impartial 
hearing. 
32. On February 5, 1998, the Court moved the case to the Utah Court of Ap-
peals. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Schwinn asserts that she did not receive justice from the Labor Commission 
and does, in truth, qualify to receive the workers' compensation benefits she claims. 
If she did not qualify for benefits, Sims could have denied them based on the testi-
mony and evidence in the record. However, virtually everything entered into the 
record proved she met every requirement of the law so he had to keep the record 
out of his "Findings" and create fraudulent "facts" that would justify his denial. 
Schwinn argues that Sims' "Findings" are so distorted and erroneous they do 
not so much as resemble the record. They are, for all purposes, his own testimony, 
often as an expert witness; he "judicially noticed" alleged facts that were not offered 
and not agreed to by either party; he did not so much as acknowledge that seven 
witnesses, testified; he cited virtually none of the evidence presented by either side, 
except McCann's ethically questionable psychiatric report. Because Sims' 
"Findings" were not based on the record and, therefore, were not valid, his order 
denying Schwinn's appeal cannot be valid. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. Did Appellant receive a fair and impartial hearing by the ALJ and agents 
of the Labor Commission of Utah? 
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Sims' "Findings" reflect the commission's intent to deny all applicants claiming 
workers' compensation benefits for mental occupational disease under the law, and 
Schwinn's case is the first to test the efficacy of this law since it was enacted nearly two 
years earlier. The commission must not deprive parties of constitutional rights to a day 
in court and of having a cause determined after an impartial hearing. Ocean Accident & 
Guarantee Corp. v. IndustrialComm'n.66 Utah 600, 245 P. 343 (1926). 
As a matter of law, the commission may not, without any reason or cause, 
arbitrarily or capriciously refuse to believe and act upon substantial, competent, and 
credible evidence which is uncontradicted. Baker v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 
141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965). 
Furthermore, the Commission may not, without cause or reason, disregard or 
refuse to give effect to uncontradicted evidence, nor arbitrarily or capriciously re-
fuse to believe and to act upon credible evidence which is unquestioned and undis-
puted. Spencer v. Industrial Comm'n, 87 Utah 336, 40 P.2d 188 aff d, 87 Utah 358, 
48 P.2d 1120 (1935). 
Finally, neither an ALJ nor the commission may deny an award arbitrarily or 
capriciously. Kavalinakis v. Industrial Comm'n, 67 Utah 174, 246 P. 698 (1926). 
B. Does the record support Appellant's right, under the law, to receive 
workers' compensation benefits? 
A. Legal Argument 
Sims' "Findings" are so distorted that they do not reflect Schwinn's case what-
soever. When the commission makes its "Findings", every "Finding" of fact must be 
based on some substantial legal and competent evidence. Garfield Smelting Co. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 53 Utah 133, 178 P. 57 (1918). 
Most of Sim's "Findings" were, in fact, his own testimony, sometimes as an 
expert witness, but his testimony is not on the record. Even so, he gave all the 
weight to his own testimony and none to any other. The commission must look at 
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all relevant evidence in reaching its "Findings" without being restricted to giving 
evidence from a specific witness [Sim's] more weight than that from other wit-
nesses. Rushton v. Gelco Express & Employers Mut Liab., 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 
1986). 
Sims' "Findings" do not so much as hint that Schwinn had four witnesses 
testify at the hearing who supported her claim and, among the testimonies of all 
seven witnesses who testified on the record, only the testimonies of HAI's two wit-
nesses conflicted; nevertheless they supported Schwinn's claim. All the testimonies 
and credible evidence did conflict with the testimony of the eighth witness, Sims. 
B. Factual Argument Citing Conflicts Between "Findings" and Record 
The following address Sims' sequentially-numbered "Findings" and illustrate 
how they conflict with the record: 
1. Schwinn began working at HAI on March, 7, 1994, not the date stated, and 
has not worked for the company since July 3, 1996. (R-380). Her date of birth, 
marital status, and the fact she has no dependent children are irrelevant. When 
Schwinn began to experience extraordinary, work-related stress, she was earning 
only $25,000 a year (R-380 @ February; Tr-77 @ 20). When she left, she was 
making $27,500 a year. (R-385). 
2. All five of these statements are factual, accurate, and relevant. 
3. Schwinn is far more than an experienced journalist. She has studied writing 
and has had experience in a wide variety of professional writing positions for thirty 
years. (Tr-61 @ 23, 62 @ 2, 63 @ 19). 
Although she has no formal college degree, Schwinn took every writing class 
she could at the University of Utah for two quarters (about 35 credit hours) and 
successfully completed two Writer's Digest School's (highly acclaimed) advanced 
correspondence courses: "The Advanced Writer's Workshop" and "Writing To Sell 
Non-Fiction." (Tr-73 @ 4; R-379). 
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Successful local journalists voluntarily mentored her, such as the late Doug 
Mitchell, a long-time, admired journalist for Channel 2 in Salt Lake City, who cri-
tiqued her news reports and other radio work. When she started at The Salt Lake 
Tribune, she carefully compared what she submitted with what was published and 
discussed the editing with her editor so she could increase her proficiency. Within 
three months, her stories were printed virtually without editing. {Id, Tr-6 @ 17). 
As she reported in the 56 pages of the Job Service file that HAI did not enter 
into evidence, and as she testified, Schwinn's last job before working for HAI was 
as a full-time staff reporter for The Wasatch Wave in Wasatch County. She was not 
an employee, per se, but worked under an oral freelance contract. (Tr-64 @ 14). 
Additionally, she worked as a freelance correspondent for The Salt Lake Tribune, 
The Daily Herald (Provo), and the Associated Press, for seven years. Id 
Schwinn reported she was not fired by the wife of the owner of The Wave, 
but that, as a freelance, contracted writer, she could not be fired. (R-69 @ 16-20). 
The details of Schwinn's termination from The Wave were not "murky." 
Schwinn carefully detailed the termination in her testimony, and further testified 
that the "assertion of insubordination," was not valid, as the missing Job Service 
records indicate, e.g., Job Service does not authorize benefits for insubordinate 
employees, but does pay benefits to those who quit their jobs for good cause. 
Additionally, Schwinn testified that she thought the wife believed she was 
having an affair with the husband, but Schwinn did not have an affair with him. 
(Tr-65 @ 21-75 @ 19). What the wife said to Schwinn when they agreed to cancel 
their contract is irrelevant. 
4. Schwinn's work in radio was full time for five years, mainly as a production 
manager which included extensive writing. The omitted Job Service records con-
tained her job history. Id. 
The next five sentences are true and relevant. 
15 
Schwinn was not upset when Epperson told her she would be "groomed to be 
a writer." There is nothing in the record to substantiate, "she believed that she had 
all the knowledge and expertise needed to be a writer." In fact, her testimony indi-
cated she expected to have a lot to leam, including HAI's prescribed writing style. 
(Tr-80 @ 5-15). 
In his "Findings", Sims frequently refers to Schwinn as being "upset" yet she 
never described herself as "upset". Even a real "expert" witness would not say she 
was upset if he didn't observe it himself or she didn't tell him she was. 
The remaining seven statements are accurate and relevant but this should be 
noted: Neither Peters nor Epperson was qualified to critique the work of a proposal 
writer. 
a) Peters testified that she had a master's degree is in social work and claimed 
to be qualified to critique Schwinn's writing because she had written some grants; 
grant-writing requires no more writing expertise than what one learns in high school 
English classes. (Tr-747 @ 19-474 @ 4). 
b) When Beausoleil pressed Epperson for any education or personal knowl-
edge that might qualify him to judge what Schwinn wrote, he admitted he had none 
and depended wholly on what Peters told him. (Tr-692 @ 9-18). 
Although the last two sentences are true and relevant, having a degree was not 
a requirement for the job Schwinn was hired to do (associate proposal writer). 
By promoting Schwinn to the proposal writer position without a degree, Ep-
person voided whatever education requirement there may have been and made the 
degree issue moot. Besides, it is not logical to automatically equate a degree, ad-
vanced or otherwise, with good writing, especially if earning it did not require ex-
tensive studies that focused on writing. In any case, a person can only learn writing 
techniques and grammar. Writing is an art, not a science. 
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Many highly-acclaimed authors and journalists never went to college. 
(Schwinn asks this Court to judicially notice that many writers, such as Homer, 
Shakespeare, Steinbeck, Twain, Hemingway, etc., had no college training.) 
5. With two and one half days of testimony and a considerable body of evi-
dence on record that refers to HAI as a mental health management company, it is 
inconceivable that Sims' could say it provided software. (Tr-82 @ 7-21). 
The original job description, associate writer, under which Schwinn had been 
hired, was not the job she was doing for HAI two months later. (R-381). 
Although Schwinn did not like Epperson, there is no reason to think anyone 
liked him-they did not respect him. (Tr-75 @3,96@ 20, 625 @ 12-16, 750 @ 5). 
6. The first sentence is true and relevant. 
Nothing in the record substantiates the next two sentences because they are 
false. Furthermore, nothing in Sims' "Findings" is "fair to say"; his "Findings" are 
mostly his own, unfair testimony. 
Both Schwinn and Samuelson testified that little that was done by second-
level management, namely Epperson, was pleasing to anyone, including high-level 
managers, and that Epperson had earned his reputation as incompetent in his man-
agement role. (Tr.-222 @ 11-223 @ 15; R-337 @ this-files). 
Finally, Schwinn testified she initially liked Peters because she told Schwinn 
many times how well she was doing, treated her as though she were a good friend 
and urged her to follow through on her request for a promotion "because she de-
served it." Schwinn later discovered that Peters was telling both Epperson and his 
supervisor otherwise. (Tr-118 @ 17-119 @ 10). Peters was deceitful! (Id R- 414, 
416 @ Speaking-doing). 
UCA S 34-3-106 of Sims' Conclusions of Law states: 
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To help clarify the standards applicable to the work place, the legislature fur-
ther noted: 
(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including disciplinary ac-
tions, work evaluations, job transfers, layoffs, demotions, promotions, termi-
nations, or retirements, may not form the basis of compensable mental stress 
claims under this chapter. 
The term 'good faith' means that the employer cannot act with malice or 
an intention to deceive. See Webster's New World Dictionary, Third College 
Edition. (1988). The employer does not have to be perfect in management 
skills. The employer cannot intentionally act with some malevolent motive 
toward the employee or those actions would not be in good faith. Employer 
mistakes or failure to promote the ideal work environment do not necessarily 
connote bad faith. 
During the hearing, Peters' testimony so conflicted with Epperson's that there 
can be no question that one of them was lying and no doubt about who the guilty 
party was. 
7. Sims' first statement is false and, therefore, not supported by anything in 
the record. With the exception of the first part of the second sentence, all other 
statements in this "Finding" are also false and unsupported by the record. (Tr- 78 @ 
4-8, 309 @ 18). 
Schwinn's testimony that she "was aware of only a few typos" unmistakably 
referred to her last month at HAI. She did not feel nor testify, nor did any witaesses 
testify, that she thought she was "perfect, or at the least nearly perfect, in her pro-
posal writing," or that she said she had never made a mistake while working for 
HAI except for the typos." She did not testify that "she needed little or no training 
for her position." Sims apparently took that information from HAI's questions, not 
her answers, during Schwinn's cross-examination. (Tr-553 @ 1-549 @ 12, 553 @ 
1; R-417 @ Nevertheless). 
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An attitude Schwinn did not have could not get her into trouble. She did not 
assert that everyone argued with her. Rather, she testified that after attempting to 
point out and correct ongoing mistakes in grammar and information, and being 
challenged or ignored but never able to get the errors corrected, she stopped offering 
input altogether. (TR-308 @ 4). 
She did not testify that "everyone's day-to-day attitude created problems for 
her," or that anyone "reacted hostilely when she merely tried to point out the errors 
she believed they were creating." As the record shows, the only day-to-day attitudes 
that created problems for her were those of Peters and Epperson. 
Schwinn testified that others reacted hostiley, but not because she tried to 
point out errors they made. She said they were hostile whenever she returned from 
sick or family leave. Her problem with their behavior was that she never knew what 
she had done to merit their hostility. (R-399 @ Nancy). 
What was trying for her, as already addressed, was that Peters told her she 
was doing the same work as the proposal writers, yet Epperson's performance ap-
praisals of Schwinn, both written and oral, contradicted what Peters told her. 
8. Schwinn did testify she did not like Epperson. So? Both Schwinn and 
Samuelson testified that virtually no one at HAI who knew him liked or respected 
him. Many mocked him behind his back, including Peters and most of the proposal 
staff. (R-418; 
The second sentence is false, as the record shows. Epperson got himself into 
trouble by putting confidential personnel records on the "public drive" accessible to 
everyone in the company. Putting anything on the public drive implies: "Read me." 
Of course the problem came to his attention. It was a serious breach of confi-
dentiality procedures and had to be dealt with. Epperson knew Schwinn was not the 
only person in the department who saw the files and it is likely that other employees 
had also stumbled onto them. (R-383). 
19 
By using "admit," unjustifiably, throughout his "Findings", Sims slants the 
facts in evidence. "Admit" implies "confess," according to Webster, and suggests 
reluctance to divulge information. Schwinn's testimony was comprised of state-
ments; she did not have to admit to anything. 
Schwinn did say no one at HAI, including Peters and Epperson, was "mean" 
to her. However, in retrospect, she sees that their ongoing passive-aggressive, ma-
nipulative behavior was, indeed, very mean. 
Schwinn not only claimed that Epperson knew nothing about her work, he 
essentially confirmed it in testimony by: 
a) admitting he got virtually all departmental information from Peters; 
(Tr-671 @ 15-684 @ 5, 729 @ 23 - 73 @ 7) and 
b) failing to cite any example of Schwinn's "incompetence". Id. 
In addition, it is apparent that what he thought he knew was not the truth and 
he did not so much as investigate to find out if Schwinn did the work she told him 
she did, although she asked him to do so time and again. 
Although it is correct that "Eric testified that he regularly received reports 
from the sales agents [italics added]," throughout his testimony, in context, he re-
vealed that was what Peters told him, not the agents themselves. 
When Schwinn's attorney pressed Epperson for examples of the alleged com-
plaints, he could not provide even one. (R-906). He admitted he had only seen parts 
of six proposals, which Peters selected to point out to him. In fact, by the last month 
of Schwinn's employment, three of the six sales agents had resigned and, by ne-
cessity, Epperson had to take responsibility for some proposals, two of which Sch-
winn wrote. He didn't even read one of them, and there was no indication that he 
had read the other. (R-404 @ Eric-didn't). 
This should be noted: In the performance review Ms Schwinn signed in 
March 1995, Epperson wrote, "Sonni works closely with the sales directors [agents] 
20 
when writing a proposal. The sales directors recognize that Sonni works hard in 
their behalf to get the job done." (R-902). 
Although Epperson did testify that "he tried to work with [ Schwinn] to cor-
rect the problems, and to win over the sales staff," he could provide no examples 
that he did anything he said he would do, on this occasion or at any other time. 
Since Schwinn neither thought nor testified that "her work was without 
blemish," there was nothing to challenge. Neither Schwinn's testimony, nor any-
thing on the record supports the statement, "The petitioner's attitude did not allow 
her to see her own defects." 
The last two sentences are essentially true, but the accusations themselves 
were false; however, Epperson made his accusations in warning and probation let-
ters, which are the same generalities he offered as "examples" throughout Schwinn's 
employment at HAL (R-904).Of course Peters concurred. As noted earlier, by his 
own testimony, what he knew about Schwinn's work was only what Peters reported 
to him. Id. 
9. Sims' first sentence is true, but again, Epperson claimed no firsthand 
knowledge about what the writers understood about the products or knew about 
marketing them. Therefore, this information could only have come from Peters. 
Also, Schwinn's work in radio for seven years was primarily marketing, and she 
received high praise, bonuses, promotions, and raises for her success. 
The first three sentences are, indeed, what Epperson said, though false. The 
writers demonstrated their lack of knowledge and understanding in their work and 
by the questions they asked. Furthermore, the evidence shows that most of Sch-
winn's successes were ignored or credited to other writers, thereby giving them 
credit for her knowledge and understanding.(R-393 @ I heard, 399 @ May 20-
know). 
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10. Contrary to Sims' "Finding", Schwinn could not have shown she didn't 
want to take constructive criticism, because it is not true. In fact, she pleaded for it. 
However: 
a) Schwinn's supervisors offered no constructive criticism. By definition, 
constructive criticism does not consist of the false accusations, vague generali-
ties, and unqualified criticism Epperson and Peters provided, which was, in truth, 
destructive. 
b) What "tainted her attitude" was not unfounded ego, but unfounded criti-
cism. 
g) She never claimed their critiques were "not specific enough." She said they 
were not specific at all and there is no evidence or testimony to the contrary. Ep-
person demonstrated in his testimony that he could not cite one example of a 
sales director's displeasure with Schwinn's work or any other alleged error. (Tr. 
319@2;Tr322@3). 
11. According to her testimony and the evidence, Schwinn did not just "feel" 
Epperson's pronouncement that she could not be promoted was wrong. He was 
wrong, according to HR, where Schwinn was told she could be promoted within the 
department. (R-380 @ Neither). 
In this case, stupid, incompetent, and too unimportant to talk to describe ex-
actly how she felt when she asked to be considered for a newly-created writing 
position in May 1994, and was ignored. As the record indicates, when she even-
tually asked Epperson to talk to her about her request, he quashed the issue by say-
ing company policy prevented her promotion. When she told him what HR had 
said, he said he would "look into it." However, he said nothing further about the 
issue and later announced he had hired Yengich for the job. Id. 
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12. Schwinn testified that her promotion to "proposal writer" from "associate 
proposal writer" took effect Dec. 1, 1995. She didn't even ask for it until after June 
1995. HAI itself has changed the date of this promotion at least four times. 
As Schwinn testified, Epperson's "commendable" rating in March 1995 ap-
plied only to the associate proposal writer level and job description for which she 
had been hired. He did not even acknowledge, and apparently did not know, that 
she had been writing full-fledged proposals for some ten months. (R-382 @ Funny) 
She "predictably" expected a "superior" rating, as would any reasonable person be-
cause, although she was only an associate writer, she was doing the same work as 
the writers. Id. 
As Schwinn testified, it was during her first annual review, in March 1995, 
that she began to realize Epperson did not know what she did. (R-382). 
Everyone in the department received the same commendations as that quoted 
by Sims in this "Finding". It was one of Epperson's form paragraphs. Although 
Sims makes the quotation appear special, it was not, and Schwinn "predictably" 
was unimpressed. 
13. As Schwinn explained in her log, which was put into evidence by HAI's 
attorney, her expectations were based on the fact that the raise kept her barely above 
the bottom of the associate pay scale even though she was writing complex propos-
als along with a few associate tasks. She justifiably expected a promotion and ac-
companying benefits commensurate with the work she was doing. Instead, the raise 
didn't even cover the cost-of-leaving increase, which meant she was getting fewer 
spendable dollars than when she started. (R-381 @ During). 
She stopped working on the two complex proposals to make the point that if 
HAI/Aetna could not afford to pay her to write complex proposals, they should not 
be assigned to her. (R-381 @ I - 382 @ is the issue). 
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14. Sims' first statement is not part of the record because it is not true. Sch-
winn testified that she sent Epperson an Email message after personally stating her 
objections during the review. Id. 
Schwinn only requested "fair compensation" for what she was already doing. 
Schwinn does acknowledge that a promotion with fair compensation would have 
been "a much higher raise in pay," but no one so testified. Id. 
Of course Schwinn was angry that the rating did not reflect the work she was 
doing and had been doing for ten of the twelve preceding months. Even with the 
raise, her compensation was close to the bottom of the associate proposal writer 
level and these factors, in combination, were insulting. Any reasonable person in 
the same circumstances would have been angry and insulted. Id. 
Schwinn's refusal to continue the higher level of work and return to the work 
her title and benefits covered was, in her mind, a one-person strike, intended only to 
demonstrate her point. As evidence shows, she refused the token raise because she 
felt that accepting it would imply acceptance of Epperson's review. Id. 
15. Although the letter is quoted correctly, the basic components of Schwinn's 
position as an associate proposal writer did not include writing complex proposals, 
such as the two she returned. 
Sims implies that Schwinn's one-person strike was unacceptable or insub-
ordinate and that HAI was justified in reprimanding her, which he could not have 
concluded from evidence and testimony on the record. Since his premise is not 
factual, his conclusion that HAI was justified in its reprimand cannot be assumed to 
be factual. 
Furthermore, taking a peaceful stand against unfair labor practices/injustice, 
as Schwinn did, is only considered "unacceptable and insubordinate" by those who 
are unjust, not the law. One must suspect, then, that Sims might be connected to the 
"unjust" element. 
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16. Here again, Sims presents a conclusion that directly contradicts Schwinn's 
testimony and Belnap's records. The only "difficulty" Schwinn had with this inci-
dent was concern that she did not have difficulty with it, and felt guilty for her lack 
of emotion. (R-79-89). 
It was her unwarranted guilt that troubled her. She was afraid that a reaction 
could emerge later, unexpectedly and inconveniently, so she sought EAP counsel-
ing. Within 20 minutes, Belnap recognized that Schwinn was justifiably angry, 
which she had not considered, and that settled the matter. There was no other ther-
apy after that session, and Belnap did not recommend any. Id. 
Although the problems at work had begun some 18 months before the shoot-
ing, at this time Schwinn had come to believe she was the problem. She mistakenly 
thought she could solve everything by commumcating more effectively and trying 
harder. Therefore, she did not take the work situation to Belnap until the middle of 
February, when she started to fear she was "going crazy." (R-89,100 @ Brief, Tr-
91 @ 13). 
17. Although the referenced rating is dated Feb. 6, Epperson did not present it 
to Schwinn until March 25. Testimony and evidence support Schwinn's contention 
that the review was bogus, because Epperson only knew what Peters told him about 
Schwinn's work, none of which was true. However, he did apparently recognize 
and slip in the fact that Schwinn is, indeed, "flexible." By quoting that assessment, 
Sims suggests this quality may be important, since he omitted other competencies 
Epperson listed. 
"Flexible" is one of Epperson's few legitimate, personal observations in all his 
reviews of and comments on Schwinn's work and, therefore, its meaning should be 
carefully examined. Sims did not mention that in the same review, Epperson said 
she was also "adaptable" and "able to...adjust to different situations." R-902 @ 1-3. 
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Describing Schwinn as flexible, and adaptable and able to adjust directly 
contradicts and negates HAI's accusations that she was insubordinate, critical, re-
fused to accept constructive criticism, etc. Also, flexibility and adaptability are not 
consistent with the lifelong compulsive personality disorder diagnosis McCann as-
signed to Schwinn. 
In addition, by calling Schwinn flexible, adaptable, and able to adjust, Epper-
son directly contradicted his own claims against her, further evidence that what he 
said in his reviews, warning and probation letters, and verbal criticisms had to have 
come from someone else, namely Peters. 
According to her testimony, Schwinn could never extract any information 
from Epperson about why he thought she did not rely on the infobase or why he 
believed she deferred to the subject matter experts (SMEs). His own testimony on 
the record about these assertions regarding Schwinn is likewise unsupported in the 
record; there is no evidence that they were justified. (R-393 @ More-We, 394 @ 
such, I, He; Tr-729 @ 3). 
Epperson could not provide a single example of either assertion on cross-ex-
amination during the hearing. Nothing he ever said or wrote ever gave Schwinn 
anything concrete to defend herself against. She could only take exception to Epper-
son's generalized assertions. 
Schwinn reported these problems to Belnap, from mid-February until she left 
HAL (R-100-113). 
In addition, there was no narrative with the review; only a form letter. (R-
903). Neither was there any discussion, because Schwinn had to wait about half an 
hour for Epperson, then he left for vacation 15 minutes after the review began al-
though he had scheduled an hour for each review. (R-393 @ March 25 - 394 @ I 
remembered). 
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Epperson only told Schwinn to sign the review and they would discuss it later. 
She signed without objecting because she had become complacent by then. Epper-
son never did discuss the accusations he made in her review, but did go to her cu-
bicle to discuss the goals he'd written for her. (R-394 @ He didn't). 
18. In this "Finding" Sims quotes from an intake checklist, which is only 
meant to help therapists home in on presenting problems. Clients' check items listed 
that they have experienced in some way, at some time during their entire lives. For 
Sims to imply that all the items checked currently described Schwinn, with no ex-
planation as to time, place, intensity, how, or under what circumstances, is irre-
sponsible and an improper (libelous) use of such a checklist. In this context, the 
quotation suggests that Schwinn might truly have had a lifetime of mental prob-
lems, which she has not. 
Sims' first statement after the quotation is not true. When HAI questioned 
Schwinn about some of the items on the checklist, she made it clear in her testi-
mony that they had occurred many years ago and that those distant problems had 
been resolved then. (Tr-405 @ 17-413 @ 7). Although she was not asked about all 
the items, during her testimony she described problems and symptoms that hap-
pened to be on the list, some of which she still experiences. Furthermore, he ignored 
Schwinn's testimony about the list. Id. 
Schwinn challenges every person reviewing her case to think about what 
items on that list he/she might check if asked, "Have you ever experienced any of 
the following?" If one has Uved long enough, one is very likely to have experienced 
most of them. 
Schwinn never testified that the marriages were "failed." Had she been asked, 
she would have referred to the marriages as examples of her poor choices in men 
and said that divorcing these poor choices actually removed major stressors from 
her life. 
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Nothing the record so much as hints that Lindblad contributed in any way to 
the problems, stress or depression that are the issues in this case. 
19. The steps Peters required Schwinn to take were not only unrelated to what 
actually happened with Navistar, as Schwinn wrote in her log and Samuelson testi-
fied, they wasted Schwinn's time and made it more difficult for her to do her work 
and meet deadlines, although she never missed any. In her log, Schwinn recorded 
ongoing computer problems, difficulty getting information, and insufficient time to 
complete the Navistar proposal without overtime. However, Peters addressed none 
of those issues. (Tr. 589 @ 3-592 @ 20, 593 @ 13- 594 @ 3.597 @ 19-598 @ 1.; 
Tr-594 @ 3; R-899, 385 @ Jan. 24, 388 @ Marsha called. 
Peters' testimony that the Navistar deadline was extended is supported only by 
Epperson, who admitted he only knew this from Peters and hesitatingly said he 
thought the deadline had been extended. Schwinn and Samuelson testified that it 
definitely was not extended. Id. (Because of extensive computer problems, the pro-
posal was not mailed on schedule, but it was Emailed in time to meet the prospect's 
deadline.) 
Again, Schwinn was not responsible for the problems, as documented 
throughout her log and supported by Samuelson's testimony. Id. See no. 19 above. 
As Schwinn recorded throughout her log and testified at the hearing, the only 
people who actually "caused" any problems were Epperson and Peters. Neverthe-
less, the Navistar sales agent reported the proposal was excellent and accurate, 
needed only one follow-up answer and was finally turned down only because 
Navistar had previously had an extremely bad experience with HAI's emergency 
services. (R-393 @ March 14). 
Neither Peters nor Epperson responded to Schwinn's countless requests for a 
computer upgrade—a simple, 15-minute task requiring a $ 140 part—for the six 
months she remained on the job. 
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20. Statements one and two are essentially true. However, by writing them in 
present tense, Sims implies that Schwinn felt during the hearing the same as she felt 
on February 15,1996, which she did not. Otherwise, this "Finding" is true. 
What is relevant, but Sims omits in this "Finding", is the fact that Schwinn 
did not complain about overtime. Rather, Epperson complained about her needing 
the overtime, which continued to be his issue with her, sometimes publicly, 
throughout the remaining time she worked for HAI as she reports throughout her 
log and testimony. 
Schwinn further testified and wrote in her log that he balked every time she 
asked him to authorize overtime on her subsequent projects, although other writers 
were not so restricted. (Tr-593 @ 8-12). This is the kind of stressor that contributes 
to depression. Id. See Schwinn's and Samuelson's testimonies. See also Schwinris 
and Samuelson's testimonies. 
21. The March 1996 review, and subsequent warning and probation letters, 
were not specifically about the Navistar project (Note that he wrote the review on 
Feb. 6, 1996, before Navistar), consistent with Epperson's ongoing, verbal criticism, 
were not specific whatsoever. (R-901-907). 
Also, true to form, neither Epperson nor Peters followed through, as follows: 
a) Epperson met with Schwinn to discuss her work no more than five times 
during May and June, two of which were at her insistence, although he talked to her 
about it briefly and informally a few times. Two of the times he met with her were 
only to discuss the warning and probation letters he had already written. During the 
others, he spent most of the time telling Schwinn about his own problems, which 
was not relevant. At no time did he offer anything that was helpful. (R-402 @ May 
28). Peters provided no feedback whatsoever during this time, although she did 
continue to accuse Schwinn of errors she did not make. (R-899). 
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c) If sales director feedback was solicited, it was never mentioned to Sch-
winn. However, Epperson told her on June 26 that he had received no negative 
feedback. (R-394). In fact, Schwinn forwarded an Email to Epperson from the 
manager in charge of sales which complimented her work on a proposal which he 
ignored. She wrote a feedback questionnaire for sales agents to answer which 
would have given her the accurate, direct, specific input she needed, but Epperson 
would not permit her to use them (Id, 398-400). 
22. Schwinn did continue to have work-related problems, but there is no evi-
dence that her work was not satisfactory. She asked Epperson for details when he 
said she had "improved marginally" since the May warning, so she could keep do-
ing it Epperson replied, "I don't know. That's what Marsha [Peters] said." Note that 
the June 28 letter said she had not improved at all. (R-399, 904-907). 
Epperson did specify the areas of Schwinn's alleged deficiencies, but no 
more. Id. She tried to get him to tell her what she could do differently so she could 
either fix the problem or prove her proficiency to him. However, as he admitted 
under cross-examination, when read in context, he did not have personal knowl-
edge about what she had allegedly done wrong. She told him many times that she 
was already doing what he required her to do to keep her job, but he ignored what 
she told him. This left her frustrated and in a dilemma, and placed her under ex-
treme emotional duress. (R-379 @ The following, July 15-407 @ politicians.). 
One must wonder why Sims quoted the "niceties" from Epperson's letter here. 
All one can surmise is that Epperson was not so unkind as to say, "I wish you the 
failure and misery you deserve." 
23. Schwinn's "Complaint" does not specify this problem. Therefore, 
"complained" is another word Sims subtly injected to discount Schwinn's straight-
forward statements. In testimony, supported by evidence, she said she was never 
given specifics or examples about where she allegedly needed to improve. Further-
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more, Schwinn never said she was not told in what areas she was allegedly having 
problems. That was the only thing Epperson ever told her and it was too general to 
help her. (R-904) 
The distorted overtime issue has already been addressed. 
Anyone whose job deals with work environments, e.g., The Labor Commis-
sion, must know there is more to a work environment than temperature and cleanli-
ness, and that assembly line environments are not necessarily dirty and sweaty. In-
terestingly, studies show that most employees rate the social and cultural atmos-
phere-how their managers and co-workers treat them-as the most important work-
place issue, even above wages. 
24. Schwinn acknowledges that it is normal for computers to malfunction on 
occasion, but she does not know what Sims means by, "It is not abnormal for com-
puters not to function due to being maintained." If he means what he says, it is not 
true that it is normal for computers not to Junction due to being maintained. Obvi-
ously, this absurdity could not have been "judicially noticed." 
More important, Schwinn objects to Sims deliberately omitting abundant tes-
timony, evidence, and detailed log entrees that describe her computer problems as 
unquestionably abnormal, from January 1996 until she left in July, and that all her 
attempts to get the problems resolved were ignored, as already addressed above. 
Contrary to what Sims says, there was ample testimony from four witnesses 
and Schwinn that the workplace imposed extraordinary stress on one writer, namely 
Schwinn. That is what this case is about. 
No testimony was elicited during the hearing about how others may have felt, 
but that does not equate with Sims' assertion that they were not experiencing ex-
traordinary stress. 
Since no evidence was provided concerning what was normal or abnormal in 
Schwinn's work environment, none could have been viewed, objectively or other-
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wise. There is nothing to show that Schwinn's reaction was anything but a series of 
normal and predictable responses to abnormal conditions almost from the beginning 
of her employment. 
Again, since none of Sims' assertions about Schwinn's "attitude" are sup-
ported, his conclusions that her attitude had anything to do with her perception of 
management and fellow workers' actions toward her, "skewed" or otherwise, can 
only be his own, continuing testimony. 
Furthermore, his statement that Schwinn's "reaction was abnormal" is not so 
much as suggested by anyone but McCann, and Sims offers nothing to show he 
(Sims) qualifies as an expert witness on human normalcy. 
25. Although the first sentence could be true, one must assume it is another 
case in which Sims has taken "judicial notice," although the record does not reflect 
that either party sought its acceptance. 
Also, "criticizing" is not the same as "critiquing", and the distinction is impor-
tant, especially to writers. Webster defines "criticize" as "to judge disapprovingly; 
find fault (with) censure.. .in this comparison is the general term for finding fault 
with or disapproving of a person or thing.. .ANT. praise". Webster's New World 
Dictionary 336 (2d College Edition 1984). Criticism is destructive, not constructive. 
One must hope that is not "normal in the work place," and if it is, it should not be. 
What Schwinn described in her testimony and log was (undeserved) criticism, 
by definition. It was unjustified, and failed to provide any specifics or examples of 
her alleged shortcomings and, therefore, made it impossible for her to change al-
leged deficits in her performance. More important, the continuous criticism Sch-
winn received was an assault on her intelligence, integrity, professional skills, logic, 
and knowledge as well as her perception of reality. It was unquestionably destruc-
tive, not constructive. (Tr-319 @ 2-321 @ 3; R-381 @ March 30-382 @ I had). 
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There was abundant evidence that personnel actions by HAI through its 
agents, Peters and Epperson, as well as upper management and both HAI's and 
Aetna's HR, were conducted in bad faith. If, as he claims, he ignored McCann's and 
McCusker's reports, one must wonder what expert witness observed that "the peti-
tioner failed to see the cause and effect," "the reaction of Schwinn to the work place 
situations presented were abnormal," and "management's actions were reasonable." 
26. Little of Sims' "Findings" are based on the record, but this one is a quan-
tum leap into the absurd. 
27. Schwinn's testimony at the hearing and all evidence on the record, perhaps 
with the exception of McCann's unethical report, contradicts the first statement. 
Schwinn testified that she was and continues to be disabled from working outside 
of her home, the main issue in both Mackey's and Lindblad's testimonies. (Tr-44-
492). 
The next two statements are accurate quotations and what Schwinn believed 
to be true at the time she wrote those statements. As she testified during the hear-
ing, she believed she was able to work and did actively seek work. It was not until 
mid-February 1997, when she entered a bank and suffered a panic attack, that she 
began to realize she could not work outside of her home. (R-425 @ When-426 @ 
this!, 429 @ Nan -years, 431 @ I've-days, 432 @ para. 1,2). 
It should be noted that the Job Service benefits she repaid would still have 
been available to her when her disability payments ended. She could have restarted 
them but by that time, she knew she could not work outside of her home and she 
would not file a fraudulent claim. 
Schwinn did not report that HAI was paying her short-term benefits. What 
she did report was that her employer approved her application for disability and that 
her benefits were long term. 
The next statement was also what she believed to be true when she made it. 
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Statement eight is true and accurate. 
Statement nine is not true. Schwinn could not have continued to draw short-
term disability benefits, because she was on long-term disability. Furthermore, as 
she could not remain on disability with Aetna and maintain her claim of construc-
tive discharge through her lawsuit, she made the only reasonable decision she could. 
Her decision was neither dishonorable nor dishonest, as Sims and HAI's 
cross-examination implies. She believed then, as she does now, that she is entitled 
to workers' compensation because of the intentional mental distress inflicted on her 
in the work place by HAI through its agents, Peters and Epperson. It would be dis-
honest and dishonorable to have remained on disability, which would suggest that 
she planned to return to HAI at some time in the future when that was not the case. 
28. The fact that McCann was paid well by HAI to evaluate Schwinn cannot 
be ignored in considering his assessment and conclusions. The fact that he did not 
evaluate the tests he had his secretary hand Schwinn to complete and subcontracted 
for the evaluation, suggests he was not qualified to evaluate those tests. 
Furthermore, he only spent about two hours with her, and Cooper, who 
evaluated those tests, never met her. In addition, McCann's report did not refer to 
either of the evaluations Cooper and Gale submitted to him, most likely because 
neither supported his false diagnosis of Schwinn. 
McCann's statement that Schwinn "show[ed] very minimal symptoms," is 
probably true because none of her symptoms are the kind that "show," except her 
extreme weight loss which he could not recognize because he saw her only once. 
This statement is inconsistent with his diagnosis of lifelong obsessive-compulsive 
personality disorder, if that diagnosis were accurate. McCusker said in his rebuttal 
that for McCann to reach such a conclusion within such a short contact period, 
Schwinn would have had to manifest "glaring behavior" such as "persever[ating] in 
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doing/redoing [m]any thingjs]," which McCusker reports she did not do during his 
four hours with her. (R-228). 
Furthermore, Gale, who conducted tests McCann ordered and was supposed 
to have based his report on, reported she did not "display any unusual behavior or 
mannerism," which is not typical of people with an obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
(R-162 @ This patient). 
The fourth and fifth statements, including, "He found her to have 'a clear past 
history of psychiatric disorder,'" contradict Cooper's evaluation of the tests Schwinn 
took in McCann's office; all her medical records; her therapists' records; five testi-
monies, including her own; the report by Gale who tested Schwinn, evaluated his 
own tests and interviewed her for about an hour; Cooper's evaluation of the tests she 
took in McCann's office; and McCusker's personal observations during four hours 
with her. Surely such a lifelong psychiatric disorder would have been observed by 
someone, at some time in the past 64 years if it did, indeed, exist. 
A person's observations (McCann's) cannot be valid, regardless of his/her 
"professional expertise," when he claims to have miraculously determined in ap-
proximately two hours what no other person has noticed in all these years, espe-
cially with such visible manifestations as those that accompany an obsessive-com-
pulsive disorder. 
In her testimony and in her discussion with McCusker, Schwinn emphatically 
denied reporting any such thing as what Sims quotes McCann as saying in the sixth 
statement. McCann based his report not on the legitimate evaluations of his col-
leagues and what Schwinn told him, but on the premises he concocted himself to 
create the kind of pre-existing condition that would spare HAI the cost of paying 
workers' compensation benefits to Schwinn. (Tr-389 @ 12-399-8; R-227-234, 930-
934). 
The above applies to the remaining statements in this "Finding". 
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It is important to note that no psychological tests, in and of themselves, are 
designed to discern a lifelong obsessive-compulsive personality disorder. However, 
as McCusker's rebuttal pointed out, in agreement with Cooper's evaluation, her 
MMPI-2 "is not indicative of serious pathology." McCann's Axis II diagnosis is 
considered "serious pathology." Were this diagnosis valid, Schwinn's MMPI-2 
profile would have reflected "serious pathology." (R-233) 
Therefore, one must conclude: McCann made his "diagnosis of choice" be-
cause it had a good chance of standing unchallenged. 
29. Sims begins this one with a bit of truth, then conveniently omits impor-
tant, pertinent facts, regarding McCusker's credentials. School psychology is, in-
deed, one of McCusker's areas of expertise, and he has worked as a school psy-
chologist in the past. But, as his curriculum vitae shows, he is, by profession, a 
licensed and experienced, respected and published, clinical psychologist. (R-235). 
McCann calls himself a psychiatrist but he has provided no professional vitae 
to qualify his "expertise." 
Although the hearing was scheduled for and began June 29, 1997, Sch-
winn's attorney did not receive McCann's report until the evening of June 25, three 
months after he met with Schwinn and only four days before the hearing. This 
raises the question: Did he or HAI's attorneys deliberately wait that long to virtually 
ensure there would not be enough time for Schwinn to secure a qualified profes-
sional to conduct a "real" independent evaluation of her prior to the hearing? 
In spite of the time crunch HAI created, McCusker kindly took time from his 
busy schedule to do the best he could in the little time he had. Even so, he spent 
nearly twice as much time with Schwinn as McCann did, but he did not consider 
even that enough time to do a thorough, professional evaluation of her, as he says in 
his rebuttal. (R-234). Still, he quickly and easily saw that McCann's diagnosis of 
lifelong obsessive-compulsive personality disorder was not consistent with Sch-
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winn's behavior. McCusker. Such a blatantly erroneous conclusion by McCann 
earned whatever attack it might draw, and McCusker would have been negligent to 
have allowed it to stand unchallenged, as would Belnap, Schwinn's therapist from 
Navistar until she quit. (R-693) 
McCusker's comparison of psychologists with psychiatrists is fact, not just 
his opinion. As he clearly explained in his rebuttal, psychiatrists study medicine, 
then study abnormal behavior for two years (four years if they go through psycho-
analysis themselves); psychologists study normal behavior for eight years and de-
viations from the norm during internships for one or two years. Psychiatrists typi-
cally do not have the training necessary to administer or interpret psychological 
tests; psychologists do. Therefore, McCusker was only stating a logical conclusion. 
(R-227 @ para. 2). 
McCann is a psychiatrist; hence, it is also logical to conclude that McCusker 
may be better qualified to assess Schwinn's mental health than McCann, especially 
since he spent more time with her and was trained to evaluate and interpret the psy-
chological tests Schwinn took in McCann's office. 
McCusker's insinuation that McCann likely "pandered" (he did not use that 
word) to HAI's needs is a justified, logical conclusion based on McCann's own re-
port, which does, indeed, "pander." Further, McCusker implied notthatpsycholo-
gists would not do so, but that no responsible professional would do so. 
HAI delved back into Schwinn's medical history well beyond the 15 years the 
labor commission requires, as did Sims. As already noted, Beausoleil gave a list of 
the symptoms of McCann's diagnosis, obsessive-compulsive disorder, to her wit-
nesses, all of whom, had long, close relationships with Sonni except Samuelson. 
Each emphatically stated they had never observed any of them in Schwinn. It is 
impossible for all of Schwinn's health care providers to have been so inept, and her 
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friends and relatives to be so unobservant that they did not even notice what Mc-
Cann found so glaring. fR-151 @ Axis II). 
Additionally, Sims' "Findings" do not reconcile with the fact that Schwinn has 
successfully completed high school and three years of college, reared four children 
(all of whom are well-functioning, responsible adults), mostly on her own, while 
managing to hold down complex, often technical and very demanding jobs, if the 
condition McCann ascribed to her were truly lifelong, or even pre-existing. It is 
apparent that Sims does not understand what a truly obsessive-compulsive disor-
dered individual can or cannot do, or how debilitating the disorder is. If he did, it 
would have been obvious to him, by her conduct during the stressful two and one 
half days of testimony, that McCann's diagnosis was not valid. 
This "Finding" is no more than Sims' personal attack on McCusker, and it is 
neither objective nor logical. McCusker reviewed the same documentation that was 
available to McCann, which included Schwann's medical records, her therapists' 
records, her deposition, and her psychological evaluation reports. Sims implies that 
McCann's assumptions were not "supplied by his training, experience, and [or] the 
petitioner." One must ask, then, from whence did they come then? 
Further, McCusker used the word "fabrications", not "lies", in his rebuttal. 
Since there is no support whatsoever for McCann's diagnosis, one must wonder 
what McCann's statements might be if they are not fabrications. 
McCusker would have to have been extremely naive, nay stupid, not to have 
known what is at stake in this case, just as McCann knew. However, McCusker is 
not willing to compromise his integrity or jeopardize his long-standing professional 
reputation for any reason. He earns a comfortable income being an ethical psy-
chologist. 
On the other hand, McCann's specialty seems to be creating reports that sup-
port companies' defending themselves in cases such as this. His livelihood appar-
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ently depends not on integrity and professional skills, but on how well his reports do 
their job. 
30. The only people in the hearing room for "a number of days" were the law-
yers, Schwinn, and Sims. Since HAI's lawyers could not "observe" Schwinn except 
when she was testifying, the "expert witness/observer" could only have been Sims 
himself. 
Gale wrote in his report that he "found no evidence of questionable motiva-
tion or dissimulation." (R-166 @ Summary/Recommendations). 
Schwinn's log is consistent with all her witnesses' testimonies and all her evi-
dence. It would be impossible for her to "change her testimony during the hearing 
whenever it suited her perceived case needs," without creating blatant conflicts with 
what was already part of the record. In spite of her emotional distress, with its 
physical manifestations, her consistency throughout the hearing was remarkable, 
contrary to Sims'testimony. 
Schwinn's testimony regarding her previous employment has already been 
addressed. Although she did not want to expose personal information about the wife 
of the owner of The Wave in a setting of public record, when Beausoleil pressed her 
for details, she elaborated on her testimony—she did not change it. This does not 
equate with "tailoring her testimony to reflect her version of events." 
Furthermore, no witnesses' testimonies, other than Peters', conflicted with 
Schwinn's. Evidence, including a large volume of medical and therapy records, and 
testimony, did not even suggest that Schwinn had had significant problems with 
stress before she worked for HAI, but to the contrary. 
Again, Sims' brings up Schwinn's 1972 10-day hospital stay, alleged problems 
with her daughter, also in 1972, and her marital problems (last divorce in 1990), all 
of which are irrelevant. However, one has to wonder, "What are the 'other signifi-
cant previous stresses' Sims is referring to?" 
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Schwinn has lived long enough to have experienced many stressors, but man-
aged them typically more easily than what may be considered normal, which dem-
onstrates her excellent stress management skills, positive attitude, and determination 
to live a healthy, productive life. (Tr-445 @ 18; Tr-591 @ 3; R-609 @ 7). 
Sims' statement about "other significant previous stresses must have affected 
[Schwinn's] mental processes" is true, but as Schwinn testified, the effects were not 
negative. To the contrary, as she testified, her nature is to learn from such experi-
ences, which she did in every stressful event prior to the systematic brainwashing 
she experienced at HAL Those previous stresses effected her in positive ways, and 
not just "to some extent." Because of them, she learned, honed her coping skills, 
and became stronger. 
The murder was addressed earlier and there is no evidence that the event was 
related to her problems at work or to her reactions to those problems. (R-930). 
Schwinn testified not that there were no stresses outside of her work envi-
ronment, but that there were none that could have caused her to doubt her sanity, 
her professional skills, or her self worth. Nothing in the record can lead to the con-
clusion that other unusual stressors were operating when she worked for HAL, Mc-
Cann's report being the only exception. In fact, nothing outside of the work place 
caused her stress other than common life problems. One must ask, then, how does 
her testimony "defy reality"? 
Sims' "To hear her tell it..." is so blatantly subjective and sarcastic that to see it 
in what is supposed to be an objective, judicial "Finding", takes one aback. 
C. Employer "Good Faith" Argument 
In the case before this Court, /fMcCanris diagnosis of Schwinn's alleged life-
long obsessive-compulsive personality disorder were credible, Schwinn would have 
been protected from bad faith employer personnel actions that intentionally exacer-
bated her stress levels under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
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Schwinn has learned that Peters reported to Epperson and others that: 
• Schwinn's work was only marginally acceptable. 
• Others wrote the complex, lengthy proposals that Schwinn actually wrote 
that were successfully selling HATs services, or at least making it to final com-
petitions. 
• Schwinn was not contributing to the infobase, when her contributions were 
being credited to others. 
• Schwinn was not using the infobase, when she was utilizing it extensively 
and effectively. 
• Schwinn was missing deadlines, although she never missed one in her life. 
• Schwinn was responsible for her computer's numerous, almost daily, com-
puter failures which Epperson acknowledged but refused to let her use one of 
three available computers in the department, thereby setting her up for inevitable 
computer crashes. 
• Providing no specifics as to what Schwinn was allegedly doing wrong so 
she could correct her errors, if there were any, and accusing her of making errors 
she did not make. 
By no stretch of the imagination did Peter's action resemble good-faith em-
ployer personnel actions, even if they had been directed toward a non-mentally-dis-
abled employee. Such behavior is not normal, usual, or ordinary in work environ-
ments-it must not be tolerated when it does exist-and inflicted unusual and ex-
traordinary stress on Schwinn, as it would for any reasonable employee in a similar 
situation. 
D. Schwinn's Case-On-The-Record Argument 
During her hearing, Schwinn's witnesses consistently supported her testi-
mony and evidence, and their testimonies directly conflict with Sims' "Findings". 
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By glaringly omitting any reference to the any of Schwinn's witnesses, Sims could 
avoid any reference to what they said in their testimonies. 
For example, Samuelson testified from personal knowledge that Schwinn had 
written complex, lengthy proposals, and was often assigned to write the most diffi-
cult proposals. She testified to Schwinn's high quality of research, her language and 
grammatical expertise, and the absence of redundancy in her work- Epperson ac-
cused Schwinn of rambling (redundancy). 
She also testified at length about the ongoing, abnormal, extraordinary, stress-
ful computer problems Schwinn encountered, but which other writers were not 
experiencing, because their computers were new or upgraded with the memory they 
needed. Samuelson also testified that Epperson and Peters knew about Schwinn's 
computer problems but did nothing to correct them. 
If Sims had acknowledged Samuelson's testimony, he would have opened up 
a "Pandora's box" that would have seriously complicated his determination to deny 
benefits to Schwinn. 
Again, Sims' refers to Schwinn's irrelevant ten-day hospitalization over 25 
years earlier. With that single exception, and only for the duration of a typical em-
ployee's vacation period (ten days), the record establishes that Schwinn had worked, 
and was a productive and contributing member of society until 1996, when HAI 
started to seriously effect her mental health. 
Schwinn worked most of her adult life. Letters from highly-esteemed and 
influential community leaders, one of whom now sits on a Utah District Court 
bench, commended Schwinn and praised her written work, her in-depth research 
skills, and her objectivity as an exemplary journalist. (R-37 - 42). 
Noted geologist Leon Hansen ("Hansen") testified, but the recorder was off. 
Therefore, Schwinn asks the Court to take judicial notice of the following summary 
of his testimony. Also, he wasn't sure he could make it to court so he wrote a letter, 
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which was not admitted into evidence because he did get there. Schwinn asks the 
Court to take judicial notice of his letter, also. (R-48) 
Hansen said Schwinn's work environment during their collaboration on the 
Jordanelle Dam project was exceedingly stressful and demanding. However, he said 
those extraordinary stressors never compromised her superior ability to work, re-
search, learn, or write well. When shown the list of obsessive-compulsive disorder 
symptoms of McCann's alleged diagnosis, he said they did not describe her. 
Lindblad's and Mackey's entire testimonies were about the decline they ob-
served in Schwinn's mental and physical health because of her work at HAI, espe-
cially during her last year with the company, and to the long-term effects that still 
prevent her working. (R-444, 460). More important, Lindblad and Mackey testified 
that there were no major stressors in Schwinn's life outside of work that might have 
contributed to her decline during that time. Both testified that HAI's hostile work 
environment, singularly and alone, caused the deterioration they observed in Sch-
winn's mental and physical health. 
Schwinn unquestionably made her prima facie case for workers' compensation 
benefits eligibility under Utah statutes. Nothing in the record evidenced otherwise. Un-
fortunately, the case she presented and the case Sims portrays are so dissimilar they 
could be about two separate cases. 
C. As a sub issue, Appellant alleges that the ALJ and the appeals board 
committed criminal misconduct and possibly other crimes during the course of 
this case, which raises suspicions that there may be corruption throughout the 
Labor Commission. Therefore, Appellant asks the Court to determine whether or 
not her allegations and suspicions of criminal wrongdoing have merit and, if indi-
cated, refer criminal matters to the appropriate authorities. 
In drafting the legislation codified under S 34A-3-106 of the Utah Code, 
lawmakers brought the state's workers' compensation laws in line with the Federal 
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Government's workers' compensation laws, e.g., recognizing that mental/emotional 
disease is as disabling as physical disease and injury, can be caused by the work-
place environment, and is compensable. 
However, the law also makes workers' compensation the only recourse for 
mental disability cases, and Senate debate makes it clear that part of that intent is to 
spare employers the cost of expensive litigation. That was the reason the court in 
Schwinn's federal case against HAI dismissed her claim for "intentional infliction of 
emotional duress." (R-923). 
In the light of that intent, Sims' distortions, omissions, half-truths, and fabri-
cations in his "Findings" and his denial of benefits in spite of the overwhelming 
evidence that Schwinn does qualify, strongly suggest there is a substantially signifi-
cant element within the labor commission, supported by those entities who have a 
vested interest, big business, so vehemently opposed to awarding compensation to 
employees who become mentally disability because of their work environments-
Schwinn's case is the first to challenge the viability of these laws since the statutes 
became law~that Sims had to create "facts", which compromise the integrity of the 
administrative judicial system in order to keep the laws from being effective. 
His "Findings" further suggest that businesses must anticipate numerous de-
mands for compensation under this law by others who have been similarly emo-
tionally damaged in their work environments, if this case were allowed to "open the 
floodgates." It is a widely accepted fact that Utah's laws are among the most em-
ployer-friendly in the nation, and there can be no doubt that business and its dollars 
are behind the attempt to nullify this law. 
Employees who have suffered emotional and mental disease because of their 
work environments are typically powerless, without financial resources, and unable 
to fight for themselves and, by law, attorneys who represent clients in workers' 
compensation cases must work on contingency. They cannot be expected to repre-
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sent clients in cases in which the odds against their winning are insurmountable 
because the climate of Utah caters to big business. 
They cannot fight wealthy businesses that can afford to pay whatever it takes 
to: 
a) hire the best lawyers and provide them with unlimited resources to 
further erode the victims' mental health through days of grueling depositions, 
as well as the financial resources of clients who cannot even afford to pay for 
copies; and 
b) hire "experts" with questionable ethics, who have the required cre-
dentials but can be "bought", and are willing to create pre-existing conditions 
when there are none, if the price is right. 
CONCLUSION 
Sims' "Findings" contradict the facts, they cannot lead to valid conclusions. 
His "Findings" ignore all testimony and evidence that lead to the obvious, logical, 
2nd factual conclusion that HAI deliberately inflicted extreme stressors on Sch-
winn. No reasonable/sane person could have tolerated them nor emerged with 
his/her mental health intact. 
Schwinn has proven that her case complies with all points of the law under 
UCA § 34A-3-106, as follows: 
(1) Reports from three qualified and objective psychologists (McCusker, 
Cooper, and Gale), two therapists (Belnap and Foster), Schwinn's testimony, 
testimonies from five witnesses (Mackey, Lindblad, Samuelson, Hansen, and 
Epperson), Schwinn's log, and her medical records establish that she has suf-
fered from a "mental.. .disease(s) related to mental stress arising out of and in 
the course of employment. 
(2)(a) and (b). All Schwinn's witnesses, professional reports, and evi-
dence prove that "there is a sufficient connection between the [Schwinn's] dis-
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ease and employment," and that there were no other factors, pre-existing or 
otherwise, that contributed to her diagnosed depression. In context, Peters' and 
Epperson's testimonies demonstrate that connection. 
In addition, Samuelson's and Schwinn's testimonies, Belnap's report and re-
buttal and Foster's professional reports evidence that Schwinn experienced 
"extraordinary mental stress arising predominantly [only] and directly from em-
ployment." (R-70,116, 930) 
In particular, as Schwinn and Samuelson testified, and evidence shows, the 
following "extraordinary mental stressors]" in the work place led to Schwinn's de-
pression: 
• excessive, easily correctable computer problems, from mid-February 1996 
through the date Schwinn left HAI; 
• continual, deliberate, false allegations against Schwinn by Peters through 
Epperson, which the latter refused to investigate in spite of Schwinn's many re-
quests to do so and the evidence she provided that proved all the allegations were 
unjustified; 
• Epperson's ongoing insistence that Schwinn correct errors she did not make 
and improve her procedures with steps she was already following in order to keep 
herjob; 
• Epperson's inability to provide any specifics or examples of Schwinn's al-
leged shortcomings, making it impossible for her to comply with his demands; 
• conflicting input from Epperson and Peters; 
• being reprimanded for having to work overtime to meet deadlines that were 
impossible to meet without it, usually only because of her computer's constant 
crashes-in some cases the deadlines were arbitrarily changed-then being ac-
cused of missing deadlines in spite of the fact that Schwinn never missed a 
deadline in her life (Sdawmn. frequently finished assignments several days be-
te 
fore the deadlines, which she called to Epperson's attention, but which he chose 
to ignore.); 
• Epperson's insistence that Schwinn must get along with the sales agents, 
without telling her who was displeased or why, which meant she would have to 
change one who had a reputation throughout the company for being very difficult 
to work with, and whom no one else had been able to change in some two years; 
• successfully-completed assignments and other accomplishments being cred-
ited to others; 
• regularly debasing everything about Schwinn, including her personal integ-
rity and professional skills, formally and informally; 
• having every justified defense by Schwinn (which she frequently docu-
mented), all her requests for the tools and accommodations she needed to do the 
work she was assigned, virtually all of her professional input, and most of her 
accomplishments, ignored, which is far more stressful than confrontation; and 
• being lied about to management by Peters. 
The above items cannot be defined as anything other than inflicted and delib-
erate "extraordinary mental stress" in the work place. Although the law does not 
define the "objective standard" it would not be reasonable to assert that any of these 
stressors could be acceptable in any normal work environment, whatever 
"contemporary national employment and non employment life" may be. 
Finally, Sims' statement, "In most cases, it is likely that the nonwork stressors 
are greater in many respects than in the working life," is another "Fact" that must 
have been "judicially-noticed", without the formalities of being offered by any wit-
nesses, expert or otherwise, or having been requested so as to subject it where If 
this is a well-known fact, where is the evidence/authority to support it? 
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Schwinn has made her case. The record evidences "that the HAI workplace 
inflicted an unusual and extraordinary amount of stress that the ordinary, contempo-
rary national workplace as well as nonemployment life would not have inflicted." 
Schwinn would have welcomed a submission of her medical records to a 
medical panel. McCusker's rebuttal did not "admit" that he did not examine Sch-
winn with the intent to reach any conclusions about her circumstances at work, and 
neither did McCann in his report. Therefore, the Willardson case is not on point. 
Willardson v. Ind Comm'n, 904P. 2d 671 (Utah 1995). 
Both McCusker and McCann had access to all Schwinn's medical records and 
their conclusions so conflicted that they represented opposite poles. In addition, 
McCann's report conflicts with all her other records, including Belnap's report and 
rebuttal. Sims conveniently omitted any reference to Belnap's rebuttal, just as he 
omitted any references to Schwinn's or HAI's witnesses. 
Schwinn asks this Court to compare the record with Sims' "Findings", find 
them to be nothing but his own improper testimony and, because invalid "Findings" 
cannot result in valid "Conclusions of Law", overturn his "Order" denying benefits 
and the commission's appeals board's denial of her appeal, and award total disabil-
ity, retroactive to when she left her job at HAI, plus back interest. Schwinn further 
seeks an award of attorney's fees and costs from HAI and costs of this appeal from 
the commission. 
She further asks the Court to order an investigation into alleged wrongdoing 
in the labor commission, specifically regarding Sims' and the appeals board's ac-
tions in this matter, but not limited to this case. 
The Court's decision in this case will either nullify the law or put it into effect. 
This is the test case for mental health claims under S 34A-3-106 of the Utah Code, 
which was enacted May 1, 1995. Schwinn asserts that she meets all points of the 
law and, if she is denied workers' compensation benefits, no one can possibly qual-
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ify. If she is rightfully awarded benefits, all employees in Utah who are disabled 
because of their work-place environments have a fair chance to demonstrate they 
may also qualify workers' compensation benefits, as they should. 
VII. REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Schwinn does not believe that oral argument would materially assist the 
Court's consideration of this matter. 
Dated this ^ th day of August, 1998. 
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